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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration plays a significant role in the contemporary alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) movement, a trend in conflict management affecting the
practice of law in the United States to an ever-growing extent. In 1995 alone,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases requiring interpretation of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),' the federal statute chiefly responsible for
regulating arbitration provided for in private, commercial contracts.2 While
these cases, and others like them brought in the more than seventy years since
Congress enacted the FAA, have allowed the federal bench to resolve issues
concerning federal arbitration law, the Act itself does not empower judges to
reach the merits of the legal claims that underlie privately arbitrated disputes.
Under the FAA, federal courts can be called upon to enforce arbitral awards
against noncomplying parties, but, with certain narrow exceptions, they may
not review the substantive decisions rendered by private arbitrators.
The Act's strict limitations on judicial review of arbitral awards have
become more questionable in recent years, however, as arbitrators have begun
to resolve an increasingly broad spectrum of claims. Once confined primarily
to disputes over the language of private contracts, today arbitration is a
judicially recognized and enforced means of resolution for virtually any
controversy arising between parties that have contracted to arbitrate their
present or future conflicts. Such contractual agreements are now binding under
the FAA even for the resolution of claims brought under federal antitrust,
RICO, patent, securities, and, increasingly, employment discrimination
statutes-a development that represents a significant expansion in arbitral
"jurisdiction."
This Note argues that the greatest potential for injustice in the arbitral
resolution of such statutory claims, both to the parties and to society more
1. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
2. Other federal statutes, such as the Labor Management Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act,
govern labor-management disputes brought under collective bargaining agreements.
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generally, arises when these claims raise novel legal questions. First, when a
party raises a legal claim that the courts themselves have never addressed, she
is unable even to present a decision from a publicly accountable judge to guide
or constrain an arbitrator's decisionmaking. Under these conditions, an
arbitrator is particularly likely to render an interpretation that is inconsistent
with what a public court would decide. Second, the private resolution of a
novel point deprives the courts of the opportunity to flesh out important
statutory standards.
This Note recommends a procedural innovation in the form of an
amendment to the FAA narrowly tailored to target the potential harms in the
arbitral resolution of disputes grounded in novel legal claims. In particular, it
recommends the creation of a procedural link between the federal courts and
private arbitrators based on a process currently in practice: federal courts'
certification of unresolved state-law questions to state supreme courts. Applied
to private arbitration, such a certification procedure has the potential to strike
a balance between the arbitral independence advocated by arbitration's
proponents and the harms identified above.
In making its practical recommendation, this Note is not intended to
suggest that more substantial judicial oversight of private arbitration would not
be preferable. Rather, recognizing that more ambitious reform is unlikely in the
current era of rapid ADR expansion, it aims to rectify a narrow yet especially
pernicious aspect of the arbitration of federal statutory claims.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925. The Act, a history
of which is provided in Part II, requires that courts enforce parties' contractual
agreements to resolve present or future disputes through private arbitration. In
particular, either by declining to hear such disputes3 or by mandating that they
go to arbitration,4 federal courts are to uphold any "written provision in any
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction.'5 The Act further provides that, following private arbitration
3. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994) provides:
If any suit ... be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to
arbitration under an agreement in writing ... the court in which such suit is pending.., shall
on application of one of the parties stay the trial . .. until such arbitration has been had ....
4. Id. § 4 provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court [that would
otherwise have civil or admiralty jurisdiction over the matter] ... for an order directing that
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.
5. Id. § 2. This statutory language refers to what are typically termed "predispute" arbitration
agreements. As their name suggests, these are contractual provisions mandating the arbitration of future
disputes between the contracting parties. Unless otherwise stated, references to arbitration agreements in
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conducted pursuant to such a contractual provision, a party to the dispute may
call upon the courts to order the enforcement of the resulting award.6
A. The Expanding Sphere of Arbitrability
Judicial interpretation of the FAA has undergone a significant change in
recent years. Earlier in the century, the courts had placed extensive limitations
on arbitration. In the past decade, however, the trend has been for the federal
courts to expand the sphere of substantive issues that they consider to be
legitimate subjects of the binding, minimally reviewable arbitration that the Act
governs. This section describes the key decision in the initial limitation of the
arbitrability of claims brought under the FAA and the line of cases defining
arbitrability's subsequent expansion. It emphasizes in particular the change in
the Court's view of arbitral competence to resolve legal issues and, relatedly,
of arbitration's ability to recognize and preserve substantive statutory rights.
The Supreme Court first advanced the notion that courts should refuse to
order the arbitration of certain claims in Wilko v. Swan,7 a customer's private
action against his broker under the Securities Act of 1933. The Court found
that a provision in the parties' margin agreement requiring the arbitration of
future disputes constituted a "'stipulation' waiving compliance with [a]
'provision"' of the 1933 Act, a waiver prohibited by § 14 of the Act.8 The
Court expressed its concern that an arbitrator might enforce the Securities
Act's substantive requirements less effectively than would a court.9 In
particular, the Wilko majority explained that arbitral legal determinations may
this Note should be assumed to mean "predispute" agreements, as opposed to arbitration arrangements
entered into to resolve already existing disputes. The latter are also covered by the FAA, however. See id.
Exempt from the broad range of contracts to which the Act applies are "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id.
§ I. This limiting language remains ill-defined. See Stuart H. Bompey & Andrea H. Stempel, Four Years
Later: A Look at Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims after Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., Autumn 1995, at 21, 28-29. Although most lower
courts have interpreted the exception narrowly, some opinions have endorsed a broader reading, see Jay
W. Waks et al., Gilmer: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, C976 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 423, 443-44 (1994),
and the Supreme Court has so far declined to determine its bounds, see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) ("[I]t would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § I exclusion
because the arbitration being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment.").
6. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994) (giving parties opportunity to receive judicial confirmation of award); id.
§ 10 (providing grounds on which courts can vacate award); id. § II (providing grounds on which courts
can modify or correct award). Sections 10 and I1 are discussed in greater detail infra text accompanying
notes 57-58.
7. 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see also John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The
Need For Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 233-34 (1986);
Jenifer A. Magyar, Comment, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration: Analysis of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 72 B.U. L. REV. 641, 643 (1992).
8. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434.
9. Id. at 435-37.
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lack the accuracy of judicial conclusions and yet stand up in the face of the
narrow powers of judicial review provided for in the FAA:
As their award may be made without explanation of their reasons and
without a complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators'
conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as
"burden of proof, .... reasonable care" or "material fact," . . . cannot be
examined.... In unrestricted submissions ... the interpretations of
the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not
subject... to judicial review for error in interpretation. The [FAA]
contains no provision for judicial determination of legal issues such
as is found in the English law.'0
If the arbitrator reached inaccurate legal conclusions, the parties might not be
subject to the proper substantive principles laid out in the Securities Act.
Although the Wilko decision specifically involved the Securities Act of
1933, its concerns apply more broadly, and courts subsequently extended its
limitations on arbitration to other areas of federal statutory law. A "public
policy exception" developed, whereby courts would refuse to order the
arbitration of claims involving areas of public law despite the existence of
otherwise valid predispute arbitration agreements. As one commentator notes,
"Courts have found exceptions to the Arbitration Act based on the public
policy underlying patent, copyright, antitrust, civil rights, and other statutes,
and although Wilko v. Swan was not based on a generalized public policy
exception, it has frequently been cited for that proposition.""
While the Supreme Court actually began to chip away at the public policy
exception as early as 1974, the first in this line of cases, Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co.,' 2 did not reflect a rethinking of arbitrators' competence to resolve
statutory claims. Rather, in requiring the arbitration of a cause of action under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Scherk Court stressed the fact that
the contract at issue was international, with the parties' dealings taking place
in several countries. '3 There is a need, the Court explained, for parties to be
10. Id. at 436-37 (footnotes omitted). The Court footnoted its reference to English law with § 21 of
the English Arbitration Act of 1950. Id. at 437 n.25. This statutory provision allowed for procedures
whereby arbitrators could certify questions of law to the English courts in the course of an arbitration or,
alternatively, could render awards in the form of multiple outcomes, allowing the courts to choose among
them depending on a judgment about a specified legal issue. See Arbitration Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch.
27, § 21 (Eng.). These procedures, and their American analogues, are discussed in more detail below. See
infra Part II.
11. Michael A. Lindsay, "Public" Rights and Private Forums: Predispute Arbitration Agreements and
Securities Litigation, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 643, 681 (1987) (citing Allison, supra note 7, at 233-34). The
public policy exception for antitrust claims warrants special mention, as the Supreme Court's decision in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), discussed in detail infra
text accompanying notes 18-35, was in part a direct response to the Second Circuit's opinion in American
Safety Equipment Corp. v. P.J. Maguire & Co., 391 E2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), the central case establishing
this exception.
12. 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see also Magyar, supra note 7, at 643-44.
13. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
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able to choose a forum for the reconciliation of disputes when they do not
share a single national legal system.
1 4
Unlike Scherk, a series of decisions beginning in the 1980s revealed a
turnaround in the Court's conception of arbitration. These decisions rapidly
expanded the sphere of arbitrability to include securities, antitrust, and RICO
claims; other areas covered by federal statutes, such as copyrights, patents, 5
and pensions16 also became appropriate subjects of arbitration. 7 The Court
in these opinions no longer depicted arbitration as an inappropriate means to
resolve statutory claims; indeed, the Court has effectively proscribed any such
assumption.
This recent rush of cases expanding arbitrability began in 1985 with the
Court's decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.'8 In the face of a contractual dispute with Soler, Mitsubishi had moved
under both the FAA and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards to enforce an arbitration clause in their contract.' 9
Soler, in turn, had levied a number of allegations against Mitsubishi, including
Sherman Act antitrust claims, and it wanted to resolve its causes of action in
a federal court.20 Based on the proceedings below, the specific issue before
the Court was "whether an American court should enforce an agreement to
resolve anti-trust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from an
international transaction."2' As a first step in resolving this issue, the Court
made it clear that the fact that Soler's claim was statutory, in itself, said
nothing about its arbitrability.2 In language subsequently quoted on numerous
14. Id. at 515-19. The Scherk dissent, however, continued the line of argument regarding arbitral
competence to interpret federal statutes reflected in the majority opinion in Wilko. Writing for the four
dissenters, Justice Douglas cited Wilko for the failings it identified in arbitration, including the fact that
"[h]ere, as in Wilko, the allegations ... will involve 'subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge'
of the defendant, questions ill-determined by arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law." Id. at 532
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435).
15. See Michael F. Hoellering, Arbitrability, in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990S, at 1, 5-6
(Richard J. Medalie ed., 1991). A series of statutes enacted in the early 1980s allowed parties to subject
patent issues to private arbitration. Id. at 5. With respect to copyright claims, the Seventh Circuit held that
a dispute over a copyright's validity is arbitrable in Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc.,
816 F.2d 1191, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1987).
16. See, e.g., Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501
U.S. 1251 (1991); Fabian Fin. Servs. v. Kurt H. Volk, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, 768 F Supp. 728 (C.D. Cal.
1991).
17. As one author remarked in 1991, "During the last five years, there have been a number of
developments and landmark decisions from the United States Supreme Court that have expanded
significantly the domain of arbitration." Hoellering, supra note 15, at 1.
18. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
19. Id. at 616-19.
20. Id. at 619-21.
21. Id. at 624.
22. Id. at 625 ("[W]e find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every contract within its
ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims."). The Court proceeded to explain in an
accompanying footnote that the FAA was intended "to overcome an anachronistic judicial hostility to
agreements to arbitrate, which American courts had borrowed from English common law." Id. at 625 n.14.
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occasions by both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, the Mitsubishi
majority explained:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.2
It is the language of the statute from which the claim arises, the Court
reasoned, that one should examine for evidence of congressional intent to
preclude arbitration.24 Alternatively, the intent of the parties to avoid the
arbitral resolution of statutory claims could appear in the language of their
contract.2 Absent indications of nonarbitrability from either of these sources,
the claim should go to binding arbitration.
Acknowledging that its holding was restricted to the context of an
international contract,26 the Court nevertheless went on to express its
misgivings about the Second Circuit's reasoning in American Safety Equipment
Corp. v. RJ. Maguire & Co.,27 the key case extending the public policy
exception to antitrust claims. The Mitsubishi Court challenged, for example,
the supposition that arbitrators are either unwilling to, or incapable of,
following the antitrust laws. A case's complexity, its need for "sophisticated
legal and economic analysis,"28 the Court reasoned, can be met with the
appointment of appropriately trained arbitrators and the use of experts.
29
Arbitral hostility to U.S. antitrust laws is similarly avoidable through the
careful selection of arbitrators; indeed, the Court explained that "where the
dispute has an important legal component, the parties and the arbitral body...
can be expected to select arbitrators accordingly. We decline to indulge the
presumption that the parties and arbitral body ... will be unable or unwilling
to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.' '3o
Extending this line of reasoning, the Court next considered the public
importance of legal claims arising in private arbitration. Again challenging the
American Safety decision, the Mitsubishi majority indicated that courts should
23. Id. at 628.
24. Id. at 627-28.
25. Id. at 628.
26. Id. at 629.
27. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
28. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632.
29. Id. at 633.
30. Id. at 634 (footnote omitted).
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not assume that arbitrators are incapable of properly resolving disputes with
an important public impact:
3'
Where the parties have agreed that the arbitral body is to decide a
defined set of claims which includes, as in these cases, those arising
from the application of American antitrust law, the tribunal therefore
should be bound to decide that dispute in accord with the national law
giving rise to the claim. And so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function.32
Finally, the Court explained that U.S. courts retain some power of review
when enforcing any award, making reference to language in the international
convention allowing countries to invalidate awards that violate public
policy.3 3 In particular, while the Court admitted that any post-award
"substantive review [would] ... remain minimal, it would not require intrusive
inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and
actually decided them.' 34 At the very least, arbitrators would have to
acknowledge and decide the Sherman Act claims.35
With the Mitsubishi Court's stress on the international aspects of the
case,36 the more definitive sign of the deterioration of the public policy
exception did not come until two years later, in Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon.37 Shearson, a leading brokerage firm, had entered into a
contract with its customers providing for the arbitration of all future disputes.
When several of those customers brought claims against Shearson under RICO
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Shearson moved under the FAA to
compel the arbitral resolution of these issues.
On the 1934 Securities Exchange Act claims, the Court distinguished its
1953 holding in Wilko,3" in which it had refused to compel arbitration of a
suit brought under the 1933 Securities Act. It did so, in part, by noting the
SEC's extensive authority to oversee the arbitration procedures of the securities
exchanges that were eligible to govern the arbitration of the McMahons'
31. Id. at 634-37.
32. Id. at 636-37 (citation and footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 638.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 636 n.19 (noting that Court "would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement
as against public policy" if arbitration agreement precluded arbitral recognition of statutory claims).
36. While the Supreme Court's holding in Mitsubishi was in the context of an international contract,
lower courts have held that the prohibition on the arbitration of domestic antitrust claims is no longer good
law. See, e.g., Syscomm Int'l Corp. v. Synoptics Communications, Inc., 856 . Supp. 135, 139 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) ("While American Safety has not been explicitly overruled, this Court believes that in light of the
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements that has fueled the expansion of the types of federal statutory
claims that may be arbitrated .... domestic antitrust claims are arbitrable.").
37. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
38. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
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claims.39 More interestingly, however, the majority contrasted the Wilko
Court's assumptions about arbitration with the Supreme Court's more recent
views. Relying on Mitsubishi in particular, the Shearson Court rejected the
fears expressed in Wilko:
[W]e recognized [in Mitsubishi] that arbitral tribunals are readily
capable of handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust
claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and
supervision. Likewise, we have concluded that the streamlined
procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on
substantive rights. Finally, we have indicated that there is no reason
to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law;
although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited,
such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute.n
The Court thus reiterated, this time in the context of a domestic arbitration, the
Mitsubishi majority's assertions that arbitrators can be expected to follow the
law in deciding statutory claims and that parties do not forfeit substantive
statutory rights in arbitration. Turning to the RICO claim, the Shearson Court
again invoked Mitsubishi, this time to challenge the position that a statutory
claim's complexity provides a sufficient reason to deny arbitrability.4'
Two years after Shearson, the Court explicitly overruled Wilko, holding
that a claim under the Securities Act of 1933 was the proper subject of
binding, private arbitration pursuant to a predispute agreement. Invoking
Mitsubishi and Shearson, the Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.42 concluded that it was not possible to
distinguish the 1933 Act from the 1934 Act as a source of claims that are
somehow immune from arbitration. Referring to the change in the Court's
"views on arbitration away from those adopted in Wilko," the Court found that
the language of the 1933 Act relied upon in Wilko did not proscribe arbitration
"[o]nce the outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceedings is set
to one side. 4 3 The Court challenged the Wilko decision's concern over
arbitrators' not correctly applying statutory principles: "To the extent that
Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the
protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has
39. Shearson, 482 U.S. at 233-34.
40. Id. at 232 (emphasis added) (citations to Mitsubishi omitted).
41. Id. at 239. The Court also rejected the argument that private RICO plaintiffs' roles as "private
attorneys general" rendered their claims nonarbitrable. The Court reasoned that the private antitrust claims
ordered to arbitration in Mitsubishi were, if anything, more important to society generally; private RICO
claims, as an empirical matter, only rarely target the organized criminal behavior that Congress had hoped
the statute's treble damages provisions would create an incentive to challenge. Id. at 240-42.
42. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
43. Id. at 481.
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fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal
statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."
'
Even after the Court's decisions in Mitsubishi, Shearson, and Rodriguez
de Quijas, however, lower courts continued to recognize a distinction between
the statutory rights rendered arbitrable by these cases and employment
discrimination claims, which many courts still refused to send to arbitration
under the FAA. Indeed, the finality of arbitral awards in cases involving
discrimination claims had been limited beginning in the 1970s in a series of
non-FAA, labor arbitration cases in which the Court had held that adverse
arbitral awards on statutory claims did not preclude plaintiffs from receiving
de novo review in the federal courts. In the first of these cases, Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,45 the Court had ordered the de novo review of a Title
VII race discrimination claim. Finding arbitration to be "comparatively
inappropriate" for rendering final Title VII determinations, the Court had
articulated a variation of the arbitral-competence theme evident in Wiko:
"[T]he resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility
of courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with
respect to Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be given meaning
only by reference to public law concepts. '46 While Gardner-Denver and its
progeny47 involved collective bargaining arbitration, which is not covered by
the FAA, their limitations on arbitral finality were thought to apply more
broadly,48 preserving a zone of nonarbitrability for discrimination claims.
Thus, for example, even after Mitsubishi, Shearson, and Rodriguez de Quijas
44. Id.
45. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
46. Id. at 57. The Court further explained that arbitrators are, in fact, selected for their understanding
of "the demands and norms of industrial relations," id., citing the fact that "a substantial proportion of labor
arbitrators are not lawyers, " id. at 57 n.18. The opinion does provide that a court may admit the arbitral
award into evidence, however, "accord[ing it] such weight as the court deems appropriate." Id. at 60.
47. A series of Supreme Court collective bargaining cases followed in Gardner-Denver's wake,
extending its rule allowing for de novo judicial review to cover other statutory claims. See Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987) (extending rule to Federal Employers' Liability Act claim);
McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (extending rule to § 1983 action); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (extending rule to Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
claim). In Barrentine, the majority further elaborated on the courts' unique competence to interpret statutory
rights. As one of the factors rendering arbitration inferior to formal adjudication for the purpose of
resolving the plaintiff's FLSA claim, the Court noted that "many arbitrators may not be conversant with
the public law considerations underlying the FLSA," id. at 743, citing Gardner-Denver for the fact that
many arbitrators are not lawyers, id. at 743 n.21. Moreover, the opinion continued:
FLSA claims typically involve complex mixed questions of fact and law-e.g., what constitutes
the "regular rate," the "workweek," or "principal" rather than "preliminary or postliminary"
activities. These statutory questions must be resolved in light of volumes of legislative history
and over four decades of legal interpretation and administrative rulings.
Id. at 743. The Court thus expressed concer over the ability of arbitrators to interpret statutory language
in a manner consistent with the public policies that Congress intended to advance.
48. R. Gaull Silberman et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Discrimination Claims,
54 LA. L. REV. 1533, 1541 (1994) ("The Court's broad pronouncements in Gardner-Denver led most courts
and commentators to believe the holding applied to any employer-employee agreement to arbitrate
discrimination claims, not just those in collective bargaining agreements.").
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eliminated the public policy exception for many statutory causes of action,
some courts refused to send Title VII claims to arbitration under the FAA.49
In 1991, however, in the case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
the Supreme Court compelled an individual to bring his Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) claim to arbitration pursuant to a predispute
agreement in a contract with his employer.5 In so doing, the majority
distinguished Gardner-Denver and its progeny: Those were not commercial
arbitration cases governed by the FAA; rather, they involved labor arbitration
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, where, in addition to other
differences, there is the danger that unions will not adequately represent
individual claimants.5 ' Moreover, the Court argued, the notion that arbitrators
are not competent to handle statutory issues, put forth in Gardner-Denver, had
been refuted by the Mitsubishi line of cases. 52 Already, many lower courts
have interpreted Gilmer to require that claims under other employment
discrimination statutes, most notably Title VII, are also subject to compelled
arbitration under predispute agreements.53
49. See, e.g., Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 186 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding district
court's refusal to stay in favor of arbitration in-court proceedings on plaintiff's Title VII sex discrimination
claims, noting that "[n]otwithstanding (the Court's expansion of arbitrability since Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver] ... the Court has done nothing to disturb its prior ruling in Alexander that arbitration agreements
do not preclude an independent right of access to a judicial forum for resolution of Title VII claims"), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1045 (1990); Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1307 (8th
Cir. 1988) ("We conclude that in the passage of Title VII it was the congressional intent that arbitration
is unable to pay sufficient attention to the transcendent public interest in the enforcement of Title VII."),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989).
50. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
51. Id. at 35.
52. See id. at 34 n.5. Earlier in the opinion, relying in part on its decisions in Mitsubishi, Shearson,
and Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court refuted a barrage of additional arguments, several of them regarding
arbitral procedure, that Gilmer had levied as challenges to the propriety of allowing arbitrators to decide
his ADEA claim. See id. at 26-33.
53. See, e.g., Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Because both
the ADEA [held arbitrable in Gilmer] and Title VII are similar civil rights statutes, and both are enforced
by the EEOC, we have little trouble concluding that Title VII claims can be subjected to compulsory
arbitration." (citation omitted)); Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[I]t
is well established by courts in the Second Circuit that Title VII claims are arbitrable. Courts in other
Circuits have reached the same conclusion." (citations omitted)); see also Waks et al., supra note 5, at
431-32, 437. Other employment statutes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act, have also been subject to court-compelled arbitration. See Richard A. Bales,
Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical Guide to Designing and Implementing
Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 591, 605 (1995) (listing employment statutes that have been
subject to court-compelled arbitration in Gilmer's wake).
Even if the Supreme Court ultimately upholds the compelled arbitration of Title VII claims, however,
its impact will be subject to certain limitations. First, Gardner-Denver still commands that Title VII claims
resolved through labor arbitration in the collective bargaining context be subject to de novo judicial review;
it is only commercial contracts that, when they contain covenants to arbitrate future disputes, are subject
to the FAA and, therefore, to the Gilmer holding. Second, § 1 of the FAA excludes from the Act's
coverage "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). As noted above, the boundaries set by this
exception are still unclear. See supra note 5. Finally, as the Gilmer Court itself noted, employees who must
bring discrimination claims to binding arbitration pursuant to the FAA can still file charges with the EEOC.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
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This line of recent decisions expanding the sphere of arbitrability reflects
a drastically changed judicial view of arbitral competence. The Court's
statements in Mitsubishi that parties to arbitration "do[] not forgo" their
"substantive rights" under a statute,54 and in Shearson that arbitrators "are
readily capable of handling the ... legal complexities of antitrust claims"
55
mark a sharp break with earlier judicial skepticism.
B. Bases for Judicial Review: "Manifest Disregard"
While the Shearson Court indicated that "judicial scrutiny of arbitration
awards... is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements
of the statute,"56 the extent of courts' substantive review of arbitral decisions
remains quite restricted. The FAA itself fails to provide the courts with any
power of substantive review. Section 10 enables a court to vacate an arbitral
award only in the face of procedural impropriety, that is, if
the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means ....
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators .... the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct... by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.... [or] the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 7
Similarly, § 11 provides that courts may modify an award only if it contains
a numerical error, an inaccurate "description of any person, thing, or property
referred to in the award," or if "the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not
submitted to them," or "the award is imperfect in a matter of form."" As
with § 10, § 11 does not contemplate judicial review of arbitrators' legal
reasoning.
There is also, however, a series of court-made grounds for vacating arbitral
awards,5 9 one of which, the "manifest disregard for the law" doctrine, does
54. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
55. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
56. Id.
57. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
58. Id. § 11.
59. For a discussion of some of these court-made exceptions, see Bret F. Randall, Comment, The
History Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards,
1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 759. Thus, for example, some courts have vacated arbitral awards upon a finding that
"the underlying contract or the award violates the law" or that "enforcing the award would somehow violate
the public's interests." Id. at 769. While the former category includes cases in which courts appear to have
performed a substantive review of the arbitrator's legal reasoning, Randall questions the validity of these
decisions: "Although the Supreme Court has stated that federal courts are not allowed to reverse an
arbitrator's award based on legal errors, a few circuit courts seem to hold that some egregious legal errors
actually violate the law." Id. at 770 (footnote omitted). The "manifest disregard of the law" doctrine, in
contrast, requires a finding not merely of legal error but of an arbitral decision not to follow established
law.
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provide the courts with a means to check arbitrators' legal reasoning.60 The
doctrine is attributed to the Supreme Court's statement in Wilko v. Swan that
"interpretations of the law by ... arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard
are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in
interpretation. 6 1 Espoused by a growing number of courts, the doctrine
forbids the enforcement of any award clearly based on a conscious
misapplication of a legal rule. As the Second Circuit put it in Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,62 the most frequently invoked
articulation of the standard, "manifest disregard"
clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the
law. The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily
and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an
arbitrator. Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator
appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but
decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.... The governing law
alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must be well defined,• 63
explicit, and clearly applicable.
Given the infrequency with which arbitrators provide written opinions' that
might reveal their awareness of a governing legal principle, coupled with the
need for the arbitrator to ignore the law in some observable way, however, "it
is not surprising that few, if any, arbitration awards have been vacated under
60. The "manifest disregard" doctrine represents the primary means of substantive judicial review of
arbitral awards. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 656 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Arbitration awards are only reviewable for manifest disregard of the law... :');
Martin H. Malin & Robert F Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and
Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1226 (1993)
("Arbitral errors of law are not grounds for judicial vacation of an arbitration award, unless the award
displays a manifest disregard for the law."); see also Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F2d 221, 234 n.5
(3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., dissenting) (following list of statutory grounds for review and reference to
manifest disregard doctrine, noting that Shearson Court found these bases "'sufficient to ensure that
arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute' (quoting Shearson, 482 U.S. at 232)); cf C. Evan
Stewart, Securities Arbitration Appeal: An Oxymoron No Longer?, 79 KY. L.J. 347, 352-54 (1990-91)
(identifying manifest disregard doctrine as nonstatutory source of judicial review that is under pressure to
expand in light of recent Supreme Court opinions "stressing that arbitrators must look to and follow the
law").
61. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953); see also Brad A. Galbraith, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration
Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law
Standard, 27 IND. L. REV. 241, 249-50 (1993) (noting that this language in Wilko initiated manifest
disregard doctrine).
62. 808 F2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Randall, supra note 59, at 766 (referring to Bobker holding
as "the most often cited formulation of the manifest disregard standard").
63. Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933-34 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
64. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. I,
13 (1987); cf. Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the
Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 215 (1992) (noting that
arbitrators are discouraged from providing written opinions).
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the manifest disregard standard. 65 It is, as one commentator notes, "a
virtually insurmountable" hurdle.6
Moreover, the facts of Bobker itself highlight another limitation on the use
of the manifest disregard doctrine: An arbitrator cannot disregard law that is
not sufficiently clear and well settled. The interpretation and validity of the
SEC rule at issue in Bobker were open to question. Indeed, the arbitrators
themselves noted this. A member of the panel explained that the claim came
"'down to... a matter of interpretation of the law,... and we now hopefully
have to come up with the right answer on this law, and it is a very gray
area, ' ),67 while the Second Circuit concurrence referred to it as "an unclear
rule of law."68 In light of such uncertainty, the court held that the arbitrator
could not have acted in "manifest disregard" of the legal standard. 69 Other
cases have made this point even more explicitly than did the court in Bobker;
they have more directly linked a legal question's novelty or its unsettled nature
with the inapplicability of the manifest disregard doctrine.70
Thus, while the doctrine does consider the substance of an arbitrator's
underlying legal reasoning, it provides only the most narrow window for
judicial intervention. Most importantly for this analysis, its use is limited to
those cases in which the law is sufficiently well defined.
II. THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND
The expansive scope of arbitrability allowed by federal courts today stands
in stark contrast to a historical judicial antagonism to private arbitration. Only
gradually, first in Britain and later in the United States, did the courts abandon
a long-held reluctance to enforce predispute agreements to arbitrate. Like the
procedure that this Note recommends, one of the ways in which English and
American law responded to increasing arbitration was with a certification
procedure that allowed interaction between arbitrators and courts. This part
provides a description of these early models, which offer compelling examples
65. Randall, supra note 59, at 767.
66. Id.
67. Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933 (quoting chair of arbitration panel).
68. Id. at 938 (Meskill, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 936-37; see also Galbraith, supra note 61, at 252 ("Mhe court of appeals determined that
the disputed SEC rule was unclear, and thus, the actions of the arbitrators did not meet the test for
'manifest disregard' of the law.").
70. See Nicoletti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 761 F. Supp. 312, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that, because
"[t]he New York State Court of Appeals ha[d] not decided either question" at issue and "[t]he lower New
York State courts ha[d] reached conflicting conclusions," legal standard was not sufficiently clear to meet
Bobker requirement for manifest disregard); Mutual Redevelopment Houses, Inc. v. Local 32B-32J, Serv.
Employees Int'l Union, 700 F. Supp. 774, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting manifest disregard claim because
"[p]laintiff's contention that complete mitigation is required in the present case, which it supports by
citation to allegedly analogous... cases, does not rise to the level of defined and settled law that is
necessary to establish manifest disregard" (citation omitted)).
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of alternatives to the current, more hands-off practice provided for under the
FAA.
A. The English Statutory Approach to Arbitration
Before turning to the American arbitration reform movement of the early
twentieth century, it is helpful to examine English developments in arbitration
procedure; innovations implemented in England would help shape the agenda
for change in the United States. Since 1698, the English government has
regulated the interaction between courts and private arbitrators through a series
of statutes.7' While these laws have formally sanctioned the use of predispute
arbitration clauses, they have simultaneously institutionalized means by which
the courts can control the substantive norms that arbitrators apply. One such
means was the use of a certification procedure between arbitrators and the
courts. Thus, for example, by 1840, arbitrators had begun to engage in a
practice, later termed a "special case," whereby they rendered their awards in
the form of alternative outcomes, leaving it to the courts to choose among
them based on their judgment about specified legal questions that had arisen
during the arbitration.72
England's 1889 Arbitration Act added a second procedural mechanism for
receiving judicial input on legal questions arising in the course of private
arbitrations. In a process known as a "consultative case," an arbitrator could
certify a legal question to a court during the course of an arbitration, on his
own accord or at the insistence of the court itself, and would incorporate the
court's response in the ultimate arbitral award.73 As state legislatures in this
country adopted statutes governing arbitration, variations on the special and
consultative case procedures were put into place on this side of the Atlantic.
B. The United States: State and Federal Statutory Approaches to Arbitration
During the early decades of the twentieth century, two conceptions of
arbitration competed for acceptance in the United States. In one, arbitrators
interacted with the courts in rendering their awards. In the other, arbitrators
were almost entirely insulated from judicial intervention. While the latter
71. For a chronology of the British statutes governing arbitration, see SIR MICHAEL J. MUsTILL &
STEWART C. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 436-58 (2d ed.
1989).
72. Id. at 439-40.
73. Id. at 448. The most recent English arbitration statute, passed in 1979, has reduced the role of the
bench in arbitration. In place of the special case procedure, parties can "appeal" arbitral awards to the
courts, id. at 456-57, with the courts retaining the right to refuse to hear the appeal, id. at 457. Parties can
contract out of the right to appeal in certain classes of cases in advance of the dispute, and after the dispute
has arisen in all cases. Id. at 456. A procedure whereby parties can certify legal questions to the courts
during the pendency of an arbitration still remains, see Arbitration Act of 1979, ch. 42, § 2 (Eng.), subject
to the same possibility of contractual limitations on its use, see id. § 3.
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model is in wide use today, the other, more interactive approach gained
legislative approval in a number of states during the first half of the century.
A movement advocating the enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements and the independence of private arbitrators from court intervention
originated in the New York State Chamber of Commerce in the early 1900s.74
In 1920, the state legislature passed an arbitration statute reflecting this
position: Predispute agreements to arbitrate were to be enforceable, 75 courts
were not to hear questions on points of law arising during the course of
arbitration,76 and there was to be only minimal post-award judicial review.
77
As we shall see below, this statute ultimately served as the model for the FAA
when it was enacted in 1925.
In 1924, however, despite opposition from advocates of the then recently
promulgated New York Arbitration Act, the ABA's Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws passed a statutory recommendation that
limited the authority of private arbitrators more than did even the
interventionist British laws. Following the lead of Illinois's restrictive 1917
statute, the Commissioners recommended a Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA)
that did not empower the courts to enforce arbitration agreements entered into
in advance of the dispute78 and permitted the parties to arbitration to submit
purely legal questions to the courts, either during or at the conclusion of the
arbitration.79
Statutes on the 1924 UAA model were put in place in several states.80
Meanwhile, laws in Massachusetts and Connecticut, while departing from the
UAA in some respects, retained a degree of judicial oversight; more closely
74. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 25-28 (1992).
75. Id. at 35.
76. Id. at 37.
77. Id.
78. As ultimately enacted, § I provided: "Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to
arbitration, in conformity with the provisions of this act, any controversy existing between them at the time
of the agreement to submit." An Act Concerning Arbitration, to Make Uniform the Law with Reference
Thereto, in Report of the Committee on Uniform State Laws, 50 REP. A.B.A. 560 app. A at 591 (1925)
(emphasis added).
79. Section 13 allowed for submission of legal questions to the courts through one of two methods:
Either (1) an arbitrator or a party could "[alt any stage of the proceedings submit any question of law...
for the opinion of the court, stating the facts upon which the question arises," or (2) the arbitrator could
render the "award in the form of a conclusion of fact for the opinion of the court on the questions of law
arising on the hearing." Id. at 592-93. These same two methods had been developed earlier in England.
See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
80. Nevada enacted the UAA in 1925, MACNEIL, supra note 74, at 54, including its provision for
submitting legal questions to the courts, see NEV. REv. STAT. § 38.140 (1957). North Carolina enacted it
in 1927. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-556 (1969) (providing for certification of legal questions to courts); see
also Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration Under the New Ndrth Carolina Arbitration Statute-The Uniform
Arbitration Act, 6 N.C. L. REV. 363, 406-08 (1928) (fleshing out provisions of act, noting incorrectly that
North Carolina was only state aside from Illinois with procedures to submit legal questions to courts, and
criticizing these provisions as ambiguous and therefore as sources of future litigation). Utah and Wyoming
also adopted the UAA in 1927. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 104-36-13 (1943) (providing for certification of
legal questions to courts); WYO. STAT. § 1-1038 (1957) (same).
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following the English model, they permitted predispute arbitration agreements
but allowed parties to certify legal questions to the courts.8'
The Massachusetts law was distinct from the UAA, and from the
Connecticut statute for that matter, in another way: It explicitly provided the
receiving court with the discretion to answer a certified question if a single
party, rather than both parties or the arbitrator, requested the court's input.8 2
The uniqueness of this discretionary component did not go unnoticed. A 1927
American Bar Association Journal article comparing the 1920 New York
legislation with its 1925 counterpart in Massachusetts praised the latter as a
middle ground between conflicting interests.8 3 Describing the need for a
"compromise between speed and absolute justice," the article held out
Massachusetts's legislation as an ideal accommodation: "Recourse is limited
to questions of substantive law. The instructions are subject to the Court's
discretion and hence, if refused, are not the subject of appeal. And the
instructions may be given contemporaneously with the hearing before the
arbitrator." 4 To this commentator, certification to the courts, subject to their
discretionary acceptance, provided the ideal balance between the substantive
legal rights of the parties and their prerogative to resolve disputes through
arbitration. The proposal that this Note outlines in Part V includes such a
discretionary component, grounded specifically in a novelty determination, in
the hopes that it might provide such a balance.
While several states thus strayed from the New York statute's virtual
elimination of judicial authority over legal points raised in arbitration, the tide
unmistakably favored New York's position. Most important in this respect, the
81. As Joseph F. O'Connell, a member of the Massachusetts delegation to the 1925 gathering of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, explained, his state enacted a statute similar
to that in England: "[Tihe court[s] shall have some jurisdiction in [arbitrated disputes] and... the matter
may be referred to the court if any of the parties want it or if all the parties want it, or if the arbitrators
think it necessary." 35 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 76 (1925).
As for Connecticut, it remains the only state with a certification procedure between arbitrators and
the courts. The state code currently provides:
At any time during an arbitration, upon request of all the parties to the arbitration, the
arbitrators or an umpire shall make application to any designated court, or to any designated
judge, for a decision on any question arising in the course of the hearing, provided such parties
shall agree in writing that the decision of such court or judge shall be final as to the question
determined and that it shall bind the arbitrators in rendering their award. An application under
this section may be heard in the manner provided by law for the hearing of written motions at
a short calendar session, or otherwise as the court or judge may direct.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-415 (1995).
82. The statute provided:
Any question of law may, and upon the request of all parties shall, be referred by the arbitrator
or arbitrators to the court to which the report is to be made. Upon application by a party at any
time before the award becomes final under section nineteen, the superior court may in its
discretion instruct the arbitrator or arbitrators upon a question of substantive law.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 251, § 20 (1932).
83. See Richard C. Curtis, A Comparison of the Recent Arbitration Statutes, 13 A.B.A. J. 567, 570
(1927).
84. Id.
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federal bill enacted in 1925 followed the New York statute in all essential
aspects:85 There is no certification procedure to the federal courts under the
FAA, and predispute arbitration agreements are enforceable.86 Also consistent
with the more expansive vision of arbitration, the FAA provides very limited
bases upon which courts have authority to vacate or modify arbitral awards.
87
While it demands procedural propriety, the FAA strictly limits interaction
between arbitrators and courts. 8 Continuing this trend, the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws withdrew the UAA in 1943, replacing it in 1955 with a
second uniform act more along the lines of the New York model.89 The vast
majority of states have adopted this current UAA.9"
IH. PROBLEMS WITH ARBITRAL DETERMINATIONS OF
NOVEL LEGAL CLAIMS
As the federal courts have broadened the spectrum of claims appropriately
subject to arbitration pursuant to the FAA, the importance of arbitrators' ability
to grapple with statutory issues has increased. This part describes two concerns
that arise from a particular aspect of the arbitration of statutory causes of
action. First, when arbitrators face legal questions that the courts themselves
have not addressed, there is an especially dangerous possibility that their
awards will be inconsistent with the substantive law that publicly accountable
tribunals would apply. Second, the arbitral resolution of novel legal issues
deprives the courts of the opportunity to establish precedent resolving
ambiguous areas of law.
A. Rights of the Parties to a Judicial Interpretation
As described in Part I, the Supreme Court has recently characterized
arbitrators as competent to follow established legal norms in resolving statutory
85. In fact, Francis B. James, former member of the ABA's committee on commerce, trade, and
commercial law, testified before the Senate and House Judiciary Committees that it was on Julius Henry
Cohen, a leading member of the New York arbitration movement, that "the burden fell of drafting the
[federal] bill." Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. oftthe Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
19 (1924) [hereinafter 1924 Joint Hearings].
86. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
88. The FAA was in fact heralded as an attempt to overcome traditional judicial hostility to arbitration.
Lindsay, supra note 11, at 647 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924), quoted in
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.6 (1985)).
89. MACNEIL, supra note 74, at 55. All of the first UAA states, see supra note 80, have since adopted
this second UAA, as have Illinois and Massachusetts. See ILL. ANN. STAT. introduction to ch. 710, act 5
(Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995) (listing states that have adopted second UAA).
90. As Leo Kanowitz notes, "Starting with the New York Arbitration Act of 1920, and followed by
the United States Arbitration Act of 1925 (also known as the Federal Arbitration Act) and extensive state
enactments of the Uniform Arbitration Act, Congress and most state legislatures have essentially repudiated
the traditional judicial hostility toward arbitration." Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the
Public Interest. The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 256 (1987).
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claims. Thus, for example, the Shearson Court, invoking Mitsubishi, noted that
"arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the... legal complexities
of antitrust claims" and that "the streamlined procedures of arbitration do not
entail any consequential restriction on substantive rights."' True to this view,
recent lower court opinions have reflected the assumption that arbitrators will
follow judicial precedent in particular.
92
This notion that arbitrators can be expected to handle legal questions
competently is not new. In his 1924 testimony before the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees, the Arbitration Society of America's Alexander Rose
explained that he "never knew of an arbitration where questions of law were
not to be passed upon, and where some retired jurist, or a lawyer could not sit
and pass on them., 93 For Rose in 1924, as for the Mitsubishi majority in
1985, the solution was not to keep legal issues out of arbitration, but to select
arbitrators familiar with the law.
Nor is the idea that arbitrators will apply established law without
contemporary, theoretical support. Professor Mark R. Lee, for example,
suggests that it is in the best interest of antitrust arbitrators to follow the
substantive law--doing so requires the least work on the part of the arbitrator
and conforms to the expectations of the parties.94 Similarly, Professor John
R. Allison explains that "arbitrators have strong incentives to decide antitrust
claims in a manner consistent with the antitrust laws .... Arbitrators must
adhere at least to the general spirit of antitrust rules to perform their arbitral
91. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987). As one commentator puts
it somewhat differently, "As the arbitration process has become more widely utilized over the past decade,
the U.S. Supreme Court has taken the lead in stressing that arbitrators must look to and follow the law."
Stewart, supra note 60, at 352.
92. The Third Circuit noted in Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., a decision
overturning the district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs' ERISA claims:
[Iln arguing that arbitration is inconsistent with ERISA's statutory purpose, the Trustees contend
that since there is no assurance that arbitrators will follow court precedents, compulsory
arbitration of ERISA claims frustrates the legislative goal of developing a consistent body of
law. This argument has a familiar ring; it is a reiteration of the traditional distrust of arbitration
on the ground that arbitrators cannot be relied upon to follow the law. The Court has uniformly
rejected this position in its recent arbitration cases, however, and we will only briefly address
the Trustees' contentions in this regard.
7 .3d 1110, 1121 (3d Cir. 1993). Similarly, in Fabian Financial Services v. Kurt H. Volk, Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan, 768 F Supp. 728 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (enforcing arbitration of ERISA claims), the court noted
that "[tihe body of [judicial] case law interpreting ERISA will continue to grow and provide the framework
within which arbitrators may base their decisions." Id. at 733.
93. 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 85, at 27.
94. See Mark R. Lee, Antitrust and Commercial Arbitration: An Economic Analysis, 62 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1987). Lee explains that:
In terms of personal labor, [following the law] might be less costly than developing an
alternative set of principles and acceptable modes of reasoning and then applying that set to the
claim at hand. And in terms of income from serving as an arbitrator in subsequent proceedings,
it might be less costly than any other method of ruling on antitrust claims because applying
antitrust law might be most consistent with the well-counseled expectations of parties to




function responsibly and to fulfill their contractual obligations to the
parties. ' 95
Moreover, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that external law
is likely to inform arbitral awards. Frank and Edna Elkouri, for example,
suggest that labor arbitrators have a nuanced conception of legal principles:
[Many arbitrators do give consideration to "the law," but the extent
of adherence thereto may vary considerably from case to case
depending largely upon the source, form, and status of the legal rule
or principle before the arbitrator.... Clearly defined law will be
given more consideration than unsettled and uncertain law or rules
based upon controversial views as to what should be the public
policy. Decisions by courts of final jurisdiction normally carry more
weight than those of lower courts.96
With this in mind, the Elkouris summarize, "It should be apparent ... that
parties preparing cases for arbitration... may well be advised to take into
consideration pertinent laws, legal principles, and court and administrative
rulings.
' 97
But even accepting the assumption that arbitrators will follow legal norms
in deciding statutory claims, what happens when arbitrators face legal
questions that the courts have not decided? Interestingly, concern about arbitral
decisionmaking in the absence of clearly governing standards was raised in a
report by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York's Special
Committee on Arbitration; issued in 1925, the report appeared the year that
Congress enacted the FAA and just five years after New York passed its
pathbreaking arbitration statute. Chaired by Karl T. Frederick, the committee
explained that, in order to avoid capricious awards, the arbitrator's "true guide
must be found in established customs, practices and standards."9" Recognizing
that, in the absence of such guidance, arbitrators would be left to their
"unconscious bias or personal whim," 99 the committee recommended
specifically that disputes arbitrated pursuant to predispute agreements be
limited to cases "of a kind which are frequently recurring and which relate to
95. Allison, supra note 7, at 242-43. Allison further notes, however, that, if more perfect adherence
to the antitrust laws is desired on particular occasions, "a court can identify and outline these laws and
require the arbitrator to apply them." Id. at 242.
96. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 368 (4th ed. 1985).
97. Id. at 369. Intuitively, it makes sense that parties will cite any law that may be helpful to their
claim. See Brunet, supra note 64, at 27 ("Law is a regular tool of mediation and arbitration .... In any
ADR process, a participant possessing a clear advantage in substantive law will explain that advantage."
(footnote omitted)).
98. See Report of the Special Committee Appointed in February, 1924, to Consider the Subject of
Arbitration with Particular Reference to its Operation in New York, in YEARBOOK OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 267, 273 (1925).
99. Id. at 276.
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matters of such a sort that the arbitrators can, in deciding them, draw upon a
well-established and recognized body of custom and trade practice." °
While concern over unconstrained arbitral decisionmaking is thus not a
new phenomenon, today the issue of arbitration in the absence of guiding legal
norms in particular is especially relevant. The Court's decisions expanding the
scope of arbitrability have assumed that parties bringing statutory claims to
arbitration retain their substantive legal rights. In language subsequently quoted
by the majorities in Shearson, Rodriquez de Quijas, and Gilmer, the Mitsubishi
Court explained that, "[bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."'' Indeed, this
statement is in keeping with the courts' expectation that arbitrators will follow
applicable legal rulings: Arbitrators' adherence to interpretive judicial decisions
will ensure that parties are subject to substantially similar statutory norms,
whether they pursue their claims in a judicial or an arbitral forum.
Without the guidance of judicial authority, however, while parties may not
experience an arbitrator's "personal whim," as Frederick's committee feared,
they are at the greatest risk of being subject to different substantive law than
a court would apply.'02 A party in this position lacks even the option of
invoking the decision of a public judicial body to guide the arbitrator's
decisionmaking. Moreover, as described in Section I.B, it is in the face of
novel legal questions that the courts' substantive review, by way of the
"manifest disregard" standard, is inherently incapable of checking arbitral
decisionmaking. Indeed, it is hardly surprising that some practitioners have
recommended against bringing novel legal claims before arbitrators.'
0 3
100. Id. at 272; see also id. at 275-78.
101. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); see Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229-30 (1987).
102. Thus, while Chief Judge Harry Edwards recommends that all arbitrated public law issues should
be subject to de novo judicial review, he advocates the initial arbitration only of those claims for which
the governing legal principle is well defined. To allow the arbitration of unsettled or novel questions, he
warns, would lead to "public law issues [being] resolved by nongovernmental bodies." Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea orAnathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 672 n.13 (1986). In another
piece, Edwards notes that "arbitrators may be able to resolve expeditiously many routine employment
discrimination claims that involve the application of settled law to particular facts." Harry T. Edwards, The
Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to
the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IowA L. REv. 871, 931 (1983).
Along similar lines, Professors Malin and Ladenson, while arguing ultimately for de novo judicial
review of arbitrated employment discrimination claims, suggest that arbitrators take a "judically cautions
approach" to the resolution of legal issues. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 60, at 1233. As a means of
both upholding the determination of publicly accountable bodies and maximizing uniformity in the law's
application, they recommend that arbitrators follow established law and, "[w]hen extending current law,...
[that they] do so in relatively familiar and unsurprising ways." Id.; see also Lamont E. Stallworth & Martin
H. Malin, Workforce Diversity, Disp. RESOL. J., June 1994, at 27, 38 ("In gray areas where judges have
yet to tread, arbitrators should avoid novel interpretations and instead extend the law in relatively
unsurprising ways.").
103. In a recent piece in Estate Planning, the authors, both trusts and estates attorneys, suggest that
trusts and estates arbitration may be inappropriate when there is no precedent shaping the legal issue. They
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There are several reasons why arbitrators and courts are likely to approach
novel claims differently. As a preliminary matter, the two institutions may well
be unequally equipped to research surrounding law or legislative history, steps
that may be necessary in addressing novel legal issues."° Moreover, courts
must discipline their reasoning in light of the fact that they render written
decisions subject to public scrutiny.'05 Most fundamentally, arbitrators and
courts are likely to approach their decisions from very different points of view.
Numerous commentators have distinguished between the public values
informing judicial decisions and the narrower, single-conflict perspective more
common in arbitration.' 6 It is concern over this difference in perspective, in
fact, that has led several scholars to recommend either that certain public law
issues be the subject of a renewed public policy exception to arbitrability,0 7
or that the courts be available for the de novo judicial review of all arbitral
awards resolving public rights issues. 08
note that "[a]rbitration is beneficial for both parties if the amounts at issue are not great or the case hinges
solely on factual determinations which, when made, will decide the outcome under clearly established legal
theories." Stanard T. Klinefelter & Sandra P. Gohn, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Its Value To Estate
Planners, 22 EST. PLAN. 147, 154 (1995). The authors continue, "Arbitration appears less desirable for a
party whose case rests on the application of a technical theory or where the matter is a case of first
impression in the jurisdiction." Id.
Along similar lines, noting the minimal opportunity to appeal an arbitral award, family law
practitioner James E. Mahood recommends that "arbitration of the entire matter may not be the best option
for a case that presents a novel or undecided issue of law." James E. Mahood, A Negotiated Settlement,
FAM. ADVOC., Fall 1994, at 46, 48.
104. The Court's opinion in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981),
referred to this difference between courts and arbitrators. See quotation supra note 47.
105. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1175
(1978). While the federal courts are not required to issue written opinions to accompany all decisions,
courts are encouraged to do so if a decision breaks new ground, either by questioning or overturning
existing law or by recognizing a novel legal claim. For discussions of the criteria governing opinion
publication in the federal courts, see Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge's
View, 35 Am. U. L. REv. 909 (1986); Reynolds & Richman, supra.
106. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) ("[A judge's] job
is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give
force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those
values and to bring reality into accord with them."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott, The Public
Nature of Private Adjudication, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 42, 59 (1988) ("Ordering by public justice
produces decisions resting on considerations that transcend the immediate dispute and the immediate parties
[whereas] [o]rdering by private disposition can involve a normative frame of reference that includes only
the immediate parties."); Malin & Ladenson, supra note 60, at 1229 ("Under a system in which
employment arbitrators make final and binding decisions in cases involving charges of discrimination based
on Title VII, there will be serious concern about whether those decisions adequately reflect the public
justice values at the heart of the statute.").
107. See, e.g., Magyar, supra note 7, at 654-55 (advocating nonarbitrability of civil rights claims).
108. See Edwards, supra note 102, at 679 ("A potential danger of ADR is that disputants who seek
only understanding and reconciliation may treat as irrelevant the choices made by our lawmakers and may,
as a result, ignore public values reflected in rules of law."); id. at 682 n.48 ("In order to ensure that public
law issues are not resolved in private fora, we must permit litigants who raise issues of public or
constitutional law to use courts even if private ADR systems have already settled the dispute."). Malin and
Ladenson make this point in the specific context of employment disputes arbitrated pursuant to private
contracts. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 60, at 1237 ("To ensure that public law continues to develop
in accordance with public justice values as articulated by publicly accountable judges constrained by the
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 105: 1927
On the one hand, such a difference in approach may surface in the form
of an outcome completely at odds with what a public court would decide.'0 9
On the other hand, arbitration's exclusive focus on the resolution of the claim
at issue may result in a compromise solution where a court would have
resolved the claim more absolutely. Thus, for example, consider again the
Bobker case, in which an arbitral panel faced what one of its members
described as "a gray area" in the law. Without a written explanation for its
decision, the panel awarded the plaintiff one half of the damages he
requested."0 A court, with its eye to the development of the law and the
vindication of public values, would likely have answered the legal question at
issue, producing a written decision and awarding judgment to one side or the
other; courts are not inclined to split the difference in the face of a novel legal
question."' Under the procedure recommended in this Note, both parties in
cases like Bobker would have at least the option to invoke the interpretation
of a court on a novel legal issue. If each party decides that she would prefer
an arbitral decision without guidance from the courts, she need not ask for
judicial input.
principle of integrity, arbitral legal conclusions must be subject to de novo judicial or administrative
review."); see also Cooper, supra note 64, at 241. Cooper writes:
There must be a mechanism for the rediversion of issues of public policy and statutory
construction back into the courts. This can be handled at the front end by removing such issues
from arbitration, or at the back end by providing for judicial review of arbitration awards on
such matters. Public policy issues need public resolution.
Id. (footnote omitted).
109. Professor Cooper, herself an arbitrator, asks, "If arbitrators display weaknesses in applying the
law.., they are completely inadequate to develop the law. Could an arbitrator have come up with the
disparate impact theory of discrimination? With an understanding that environmental sexual harassment is
sex discrimination?" Cooper, supra note 64, at 218. But see Susan A. Fitzgibbon, The Judicial Itch, 34 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 485, 503 (1990) (suggesting that labor arbitrators "have demonstrated the ability to decide
cases involving external law, and even novel issues, as well as courts").
110. The district court felt that the 50% award itself constituted a manifest disregard of the law. See
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 636 F. Supp. 444, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The
arbitrators' disregard of the law is underscored by the fact that although Bobker claimed he lost profits
totalling $23,000, the arbitrators, without explanation, reduced the request by exactly fifty percent (after
allowing for costs and expenses)." (footnote omitted)). The appeals court, however, countered that the 50%
award may have indicated the arbitrators' true estimate of the damages, and noted that "the arbitrators were
not required to explain their computation." 808 F.2d 930, 937 (2d Cir. 1986). In any case, it seems likely
that the splitting of the award must have had some connection to the ambiguity of the governing legal
principle. For a case in which arbitration served even more clearly to avoid the resolution of a novel legal
issue in favor of a compromise, see John V. O'Hara, Comment, The New Jersey Alternative Procedure for
Dispute Resolution Act: Vanguard of a "Better Way"?, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1747-51 (1988)
(describing IBM-Fujitsu arbitration, in which unnavigated legal terrain in copyright law was avoided in
favor of arbitral compromise).
11. Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case
for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 157, 161 (1989) ("[I]n arbitration, a compromise decision is
possible while judicial decisions tend to be either win all or lose all.").
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B. Developing Precedent
Another difficulty with resolving novel legal questions in private
arbitration is the fact that this very process deprives the courts of the
opportunity to resolve unsettled issues of statutory interpretation. Yet as one
commentator notes, "The ambiguous statutory language that frequently results
from legislative compromise remains with the understanding that the courts
will supply an interpretation."'1 2 In denying courts the opportunity to provide
such interpretation, arbitration may reduce individuals' certainty about what
private activity is within the law" 3 and, consequently, encourage greater
litigation in the future." 4 Moreover, reliance on private tribunals deprives
Congress of the ability to monitor the judicial interpretation of statutes and
thereby to make any modifications in statutory language necessary to correct
readings at odds with its intent. A party's right to request the judicial
resolution of a novel legal claim, when used, would have the additional benefit
of mitigating these broader, societal disadvantages of arbitration.
1. Arbitration and Precedent
In diverting cases from the courts to fora that do not produce binding
precedent and, in fact, only rarely produce written explanations for their
awards, the arbitration of statutory claims has the potential to stifle the
development of the law. While some contemporary scholars have made this
observation,' 5 a number of commentators recognized arbitration as a threat
to precedent development as early as the 1920s and 1930s.' 6 Professor Carl
112. O'Hara, supra note 110, at 1746.
113. Henry M. Hart, Jr., and Albert M. Sacks, for example, provide a substantial list of reasons in
favor of following precedent that translates easily into an enumeration of the positive effects of the creation
of precedent. Among these is the "desirability of enabling people to plan their affairs at the stage of
primary private activity with the maximum attainable confidence." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 587 (tentative
ed. 1958).
114. See O'Hara, supra note 110, at 1750.
115. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 64, at 19-20 (noting, in comparing private and public dispute
resolution mechanisms, that "society gains more from litigation than would be produced if litigation were
left to the private market. ... [and Il]itigation guides third parties" by "apply[ing] ... vague positive law
to concrete fact situations" (footnote omitted)); O'Hara, supra note 110, at 1745-51 (explaining benefits
of creation of formal precedent and identifying arbitration's capacity to undermine this process).
116. Even Julius Henry Cohen, the primary author of the New York Arbitration Act and the ABA's
version of the federal act-adopted by Congress with few modifications to become the
FAA-acknowledged the trade-off between the use of arbitration and the development of judge-made law.
In his well-known 1918 book, Commercial Arbitration and the Law, he attempted to defuse this concern,
noting that:
From the point of view of society, in some instances it might sometimes be better to secure a
determination of the particular question of constitutional or other law involved; yet this
consideration has never prevailed with the Court, nor resulted in the rejection of an adjustment
or a settlement of the controversy, with the consequent waiver and elimination of an interesting
and perhaps important question of law.
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F. Taeusch, for example, in a 1934 article characterizing the business world's
view of commercial arbitration, reminded his readers of the benefits of judicial
precedent. Describing the commercial sector's disdain for the creation of legal
precedent governing its activities, Taeusch warned that this position ignored
"that a social-economic system which, like ours, stresses property rights,
becomes inevitably involved in the necessity of certainty in regard to their
vindication, and that it is doubtful whether such certainty can be secured
through a series of sporadic arbitrations which purposely avoid precedent.""
17
Taeusch's admonition continued with the observation that "the finality which
characterizes most arrangements for arbitration settlements ... contrasts
radically with the method of judicial review and still further prevents the
reflective development of business doctrine."'"18 Based on a similar concern,
Philip G. Phillips, a contemporary of Taeusch's, took the position that
arbitration is useful only when it decides issues of pure fact." 9 Phillips
argued that allowing courts to handle the legal issues would not only assure
valuable standardization in the law, but would permit courts to generate more
innovative, probusiness precedent.
120
The petitioner in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.121 also raised
the issue of precedent development in challenging the arbitrability of his
ADEA claim. He argued that, because "arbitrators often will not issue written
opinions," there will be "a lack of public knowledge of employers'
discriminatory policies, an inability to obtain effective appellate review, and
a stifling of the development of the law."'22 In response, the Court noted that,
under the New York Stock Exchange arbitration rules at issue in Gilmer,
arbitrators must provide a written description of the controversy and the
reasons for their award.'23 Moreover, the Court reasoned, the law will
continue to develop because most ADEA claims will not be arbitrated and will
therefore reach the courts; the lack-of-precedent argument, it suggested, applies
equally to settlement, which goes on without public disclosure or the creation
of precedent.
124
As for the Court's first response, while the New York Stock Exchange
may require written awards from its arbitrators, the reasoning of most arbitral
JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 12 (1918). While Cohen ultimately
decided that the value of unimpeded arbitral authority outweighed its possible costs in terms of forgone
precedent, he was at least aware of these costs.
117. Carl F. Taeusch, Extrajudicial Settlement of Controversies: The Business Man's Opinion: Trial
at Law v. Nonjudicial Settlement, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 147, 156 (1934).
118. Id.
119. See Philip G. Phillips, A Practical Method for the Determination of Business Fact, 82 U. PA. L.
REV. 230, 251 n.88 (1934).
120. Id. at 250-51. For another commentator supporting this proposition, see Harry S. WVollheim,
Commercial Arbitration and the Law, 13 MARQ. L. REv. 225, 228 (1929).
121. 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
122. See id. at 31 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 31-32.
124. Id. at 32.
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decisions is never put in writing. Furthermore, even written arbitral awards
carry no binding legal authority, and thus do not add to the stock of controlling
legal precedent. With respect to the argument that courts will continue to
resolve most ADEA claims, first, more and more employers in the wake of
Gilmer are designing contracts with their employees to require the arbitration
of such claims.'2 Second, unlike the petitioner's argument in Gilmer that all
ADEA claims should be exempt from arbitration, the recommendation
proposed in this Note would only require the judicial resolution of those claims
that actually raise novel questions; even if very few ADEA claims are
arbitrated, it is important to allow those involving novel claims to reach the
courts. Finally, it is true that settlement deprives the courts of an opportunity
to resolve what may be a novel legal question. But there is still a stark
distinction between settlement and the arbitration of statutory claims pursuant
to a predispute agreement. Parties realize at the time of settlement that their
claim is novel and nevertheless opt to resolve it informally, just as this Note's
proposed procedure would allow parties to decide not to request judicial
intervention into their arbitration once a dispute has arisen. Parties bound to
arbitrate pursuant to a predispute agreement, however, commit themselves to
invoking an informal dispute resolution method before they know whether their
claim raises issues that the courts have not addressed.
Commentators defending the arbitration of antitrust claims in particular
have also challenged the proposition that arbitration reduces the generation of
precedent. 2 6 They have argued that the number of arbitrated antitrust claims
will remain too small to cause a significant decline in precedent-generating
litigation; 7 that courts, like arbitrators, often do not publish opinions; 2 8
and that a lack of precedent is self-correcting because any resulting ambiguity
will simply inspire later litigation."9 These responses are not persuasive,
however. First, with respect to the small number of antitrust arbitrations, the
minimally intrusive procedure recommended in Part V of this Note offers a
way of using court intervention only when there are in fact novel questions in
private arbitration. If such novel issues rarely arise outside the courts, then the
procedure will rarely be invoked; this is not an argument for not having such
a procedure in place. Second, while it is true that courts often do not publish
their opinions, existing criteria designed to govern judicial discretion in
determining what to publish emphasize the need for written opinions in cases
that contribute significantly to the body of precedent by questioning or
125. Bompey & Stempel, supra note 5, at 22 ("Since the Supreme Court's ruling [in Gilmer],
numerous companies ... have implemented policies requiring their employees to submit to binding
arbitration all disputes arising from their employment.., that cannot be resolved through internal dispute
resolution mechanisms.").
126. See Allison, supra note 7, at 241-42; Lee, supra note 94, at 14-18.
127. See Allison, supra note 7, at 241.
128. See id. at 242.
129. See Lee, supra note 94, at 18.
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overturning existing law or by resolving novel questions. 3 Finally, the self-
correction argument accepts that there must be additional, future litigation
when a legal point is left unresolved. Again, however, the crux of the
precedent argument in this section is that judicial decisions can play a role in
increasing certainty about the law and, by implication, can prevent future
litigation.
2. Congressional Monitoring
While the need for courts to generate precedent is important in itself, the
formal, public resolution of novel issues also keeps Congress informed about
the interpretation of its statutes. As a result, legislative reform is possible as
a check on unintended applications of the law.' Such a reform process is
visible, for example, in the context of civil RICO legislation. On several
occasions, Congress has held hearings to consider the expansive use of civil
RICO to encompass activities that Congress had never intended to penalize
under the statute. 32 As Stephen S. Trott, an Assistant Attorney General,
noted in speaking before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1985, "We
understand and share the concern of those who believe that, to a significant
extent, private civil RICO is not being used as originally intended, and we
stand willing and ready to join in the effort to see what can be done to correct
this situation."133 While bills have been proposed to amend civil RICO in an
effort to rein in its scope, these have "either been tabled or defeated by a
narrow margin."' 34 Thus, although Congress has not yet elected to modify
the language of the RICO statute, its awareness of federal court RICO
decisions enables it to contemplate measures to correct adjudicative trends at
odds with its intent. Decisions contrary to congressional intent, if they take
place in arbitration, will likely go unnoticed.
130. See supra note 105.
131. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 60, at 1237 ("Judicial mistakes are... more likely to be
corrected legislatively because of their sweeping precedential value than are arbitral mistakes which have
no stare decisis value. Indeed, the history of employment discrimination laws is replete with legislative
correction of judicial mistakes.').
132. See Wendy W. Wolfe, Case Note, Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation: A
Warning to Legitimate Business, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 659,680 n.164 (1994) (listing congressional hearings
and reports concerning civil RICO reform, dating from 1985 to 1990).
133. Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 94 (1985) (statement of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S.
Dep't of Justice). Later in his testimony, Trott indicated explicitly that the controversy surrounding private
RICO suits "has led to growing pressure for statutory changes." Id. at 102 (statement of Stephen S. Trott).
134. Wolfe, supra note 132, at 680.
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3. An Example: Antitrust
While scholars and, more recently, Congress, 35 have acknowledged the
potential dangers inherent in arbitration's inability to create precedent,
particular attention has been given to the importance of precedent in certain
substantive areas of the law. Commentators, for example, have noted the value
of formal adjudication in creating socially valuable precedent in the context of
antitrust law.
The importance of judicial precedent to the development of U.S. antitrust
doctrine is understandable considering what William F. Baxter describes as the
"common law nature" of this body of law. 36 Looking to the central passages
in the Clayton and Sherman Acts, Baxter explains their generality:
In failing to provide more guidance, the framers of our antitrust
laws .... [possessed an] awareness of the diversity of business
conduct and ... the knowledge that ... detailed statutes ... would
lack the flexibility needed to encourage (and at times even permit)
desirable conduct. To provide this flexibility, Congress adopted what
is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a common-law
refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the
most general statutory directions.
37
Thus, "[b]y adopting a common-law approach, Congress in effect delegated
much of its lawmaking power to the judicial branch."' 38 Moreover, the
common law character of the law, Baxter argues, is as appropriate in today's
antitrust arena as it was in the days of Senator Sherman and Congressman
Clayton. 39 Similarly, David Klingsberg concludes a 1991 article on private
antitrust suits with the following commentary:
Congressional enactment of private remedies not only has provided
additional deterrence of potential violators and a means of
compensation to victims, but also assures a cauldron of cases and
controversies that produce a continually evolving brew of developing
antitrust doctrine. Through this common law process, today's antitrust
principles now seem more economically rational than those of the
not-so-distant past. Although we have arrived at antitrust's centennial,
we have not reached the millennium, and the continuation of the
135. See infra Part IV.
136. See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law"
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661 (1982). Baxter was serving as Assistant Attorney General
for Antitrust when he published this article.
137. Id. at 663.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 669. Baxter describes "the conceptual quagmire faced by those who sought to regulate
competitive business behavior at the turn of the century and the need for a common-law approach to
antitrust law." Id. at 668-69. He adds, "[tihis need remains apparent today as the law continues to evolve."
Id. at 669.
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process, enriched by privately filed cases, is likely to provide even
more refined means of assuring the competitiveness of the
economy. 40
Perhaps recognizing the particularly important role of new suits in antitrust
law, several authors, writing well before the courts began to enforce predispute
arbitration agreements, warned specifically about the potentially deleterious
effects of antitrust arbitration. In 1969, for example, in the aftermath of the
Second Circuit's American Safety decision refusing to order the arbitration of
a Sherman Act claim,'4 ' Professor Robert Pitofsky noted arbitration's
potential dangers as a means of handling antitrust disputes: 42 While he
emphasized the third-party effects of erroneous awards, among his criticisms
was the potential for private dispute resolution to deprive the courts of valuable
opportunities to generate new precedent.1
43
Writing in the same year, John J. Finn speculated as to the impact on
antitrust doctrine of arbitrators freely developing their own substantive
standards."4 While Finn's analysis differed from Pitofsky's in that he
envisioned an independent and competing body of law generated by private
arbitrators, his argument similarly touched on the development of precedent.
Finn noted that "[a] myriad of judicial precedents have been necessary to
establish standards for 'unreasonable' restraints of trade and per se violations
of the antitrust laws;" 145 and he stressed the continuing "necessity of
consistent interpretation of antitrust policy" by the courts. 46 He thus
identified a need "to preserve the ... judicial development of substantive
antitrust law."'
147
IV. CONGRESSIONAL MEASURES EXEMPTING NOVEL LEGAL CLAIMS
FROM ARBITRATION
In 1990, motivated by the docket-control problems of administrative law
judges and federal district courts, Congress passed the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act (ADRA),148 explicitly encouraging federal agencies to use
140. David Klingsberg, Balancing the Benefits and Detriments of Private Antitrust Enforcement:
Detrebling, Antitrust Injury, Standing, and Other Proposed Solutions, in 3 ANTrRuST IN TRANSITION 1155,
1181 (Milton Handler ed., 1991).
141. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
142. See Robert Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072 (1969).
143. See id. at 1076-77 (noting that, because arbitral awards are unwritten and immune from
substantive judicial review, "other businessmen in a particular industry . .. will not be put on notice as to
the boundaries of permissible behavior").
144. See John J. Finn, Comment, Private Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement: A Conflict of Policies,
10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 406 (1969).
145. Id. at 412.
146. Id. at 417.
147. Id.
148. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
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informal procedures as an alternative to formal adjudication. The statute lapsed
pursuant to a sunset provision in October 1995, and an indefinite extension of
the Act is currently before Congress. Whether or not it is ultimately renewed,
the ADRA is interesting in that it recognizes limits to the appropriate use of
arbitration not reflected in the FAA.
Taking care to promote the consistent implementation of formal legal rules,
the ADRA mandates that "[t]he arbitrator shall interpret and apply relevant
statutory and regulatory requirements, legal precedents, and policy
directives."'49 Also included in the ADRA is a list of factors to be
considered by the parties to a dispute in deciding whether to go to
arbitration.150 The bulk of the criteria concern the public externalities of
arbitration, and, as such, provide an interesting contrast with the factors
permitting judicial review under the FAA.15' Recommended by the
Administrative Conference of the United States, the first two of the ADRA's
six criteria acknowledge the public value of the precedents that formal conflict
resolution generates. Specifically, "[a]n agency shall consider not using a
dispute resolution proceeding if'
(1) a definitive or authoritative resolution of the matter is required for
precedential value, and such a proceeding is not likely to be accepted
generally as an authoritative precedent;
(2) the matter involves... significant questions of Government policy
that require additional procedures before a final resolution may be
made, and such a proceeding would not likely serve to develop a
recommended policy for the agency[.]1
52
Witnesses before the congressional committees responsible for drafting the
ADRA made clear the purpose of these qualifiers as a means of protecting the
development of precedent. The House Judiciary Committee, for example, in its
report accompanying the bill to the floor, stated, "[o]f course, claims which
establish precedent or involve complex issues of law may be better suited for
149. 5 U.S.C. § 579(c)(5) (1994).
150. Id. § 572(b).
151. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1994). These factors concern the rights of the parties involved in the dispute.
See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
152. 5 U.S.C. § 572(b)(1)-(2) (1994). Chief Judge Edwards, in a 1978 article, recommended a
procedure by which the EEOC could select from its caseload discrimination claims appropriate for
arbitration. Edwards's suggested procedure similarly distinguished between settled and unsettled areas of
law. See Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration as an Alternative in Equal Employment Disputes, ARB. J., Dec.
1978, at 23. As one of the six categories of claims that he suggested should be proper subjects of
adjudication, rather than arbitration, Edwards included "grievances... involving unsettled areas of the
law." Id. at 24. More recently, a similar recommendation was made, this time in the form of an amendment
to Title VII that would allow the EEOC to determine which employment discrimination claims should go
to arbitration. See Laura R. Hillock, Comment, Arbitration of 7Ttle VII and Parallel State Discrimination
Claims: A Proposal, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 179, 206-07 (1990). Among other criteria, Hillock recommended
that the EEOC should prevent the arbitration of claims raising "novel statutory construction[s] of Title vir
or "case[s] of first impression which requirei] resolution by a court." Id. at 207.
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full litigation."153 Similarly, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Stuart E.
Schiffer's 1988 submission to the House subcommittee considering the bill
included the observation that "[c]ases which are expected to establish important
legal precedent. .. do not lend themselves to resolution by mini-trial [a form
of alternative dispute resolution]." 5 4 Along the same lines, Marshall Breger,
chair of the Administrative Conference, responded to "concerns that resolving
many disputes through informal means will fail to yield precedents for future
jurists" by recommending that "[g]enerally [arbitrated cases] should not involve
precedential issues or the application of fundamental legal norms that are
evolving."' 55 Finally, Senator Charles Grassley raised a similar point on the
Senate floor, stating, "[o]f course, even private disputes can raise public policy
questions that are inappropriate for ADR. The bill carefully recognizes this,
and exempts entire categories of cases from coverage, such as cases in which
precedent is important. ,,56 In a sense, the ADRA is reminiscent of the
recommendation put forth by Frederick's New York City Bar Association
committee some sixty-five years earlier. 57 Today, though confined to the
context of disputes involving federal administrative agencies, Congress itself
has limited arbitration to claims that do not raise novel legal questions.
The ADRA is not alone among congressional initiatives in its awareness
of the particular dangers in arbitrating novel issues. In 1988, Congress enacted
a statute authorizing selected federal judicial districts to introduce court-
annexed arbitration. Under this process, a court can refer cases from its civil
docket, reserving the parties' right to appeal the award back to the court. 58
As one of the guidelines that the statute establishes, courts are required to
exempt from arbitration, "sua sponte or on motion of a party, any case ... in
which the objectives of arbitration would not be realized.., because the case
involves complex or novel legal issues.', 159 Thus, as with the ADRA,
Congress recognized unique problems in the arbitration of novel legal claims.
The next part proposes that this same recognition motivate a change in the
FAA as well.
153. H.R. REP. No. 513, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990).
154. Alternative Dispute Resolution Use by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 52 (1988) (written submission of Stuart E. Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
155. Id. at 75, 77 (written submission of Marshall J. Breger, chair of the Administrative Conference
of United States) (emphasis added).
156. 136 CONG. REc. S18,090 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
158. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 901(a), 102 Stat.
4642, 4659-62 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994)).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 652(c) (1994). This requirement, among others that the Act imposes, led one
commentator to note that "[s]uch standards would ensure that the law continues to grow and that judicial
pronouncements will not be foreclosed on important issues of public policy." Irving R. Kaufman, Reform
for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 31
(1990).
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V. A RECOMMENDATION FOR REFORM
While the ADRA's encouragement of federal agencies to decide whether
cases raise novel legal issues may work in the administrative context, and
court-annexed arbitration can rely on the courts to distinguish between the
novel and the legally routine, a different approach is needed when both parties
are private and are appearing before a private arbitrator. An appeals process
whereby a federal court reviews an arbitrator's legal reasoning, however,
would likely encounter significant opposition. Courts 60  and
commentators 6' alike have remarked on parties' interest in receiving arbitral
awards that are final. At the same time, the courts benefit from arbitration as
a source of relief from an ever-increasing caseload. 162 Allowing any party
dissatisfied with an arbitral award to bring it to a federal court on the ground
that it involves a novel point of law would be seen as a serious affront to these
interests. Moreover, the effective implementation of such a procedure would
require that arbitrators put all of their awards in writing, thereby lengthening
the arbitral process and potentially eliminating much 'of the privacy that
proponents hold out as another of arbitration's greatest virtues.
163
This Note has outlined two reasons why novel legal questions provide the
most compelling subject for formal judicial resolution. This part suggests a
procedural reform narrowly tailored to mitigate these particular dangers,
keeping in mind the need to preserve the finality of arbitral awards and the
judicial interest in lightening the courts' already overwhelming caseload.
160. The federal courts have repeatedly recognized the importance of this "finality interest" in
arbitration. See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 167 (1983) ("[IThe
short limitations period for vacating the arbitral award would protect the interest in finality of the opposing
party to the arbitration .... ); Christianson v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 681 E2d 577, 580 (9th Cir.
1982) ("Vhen an arbitration decision has been rendered, the interest in finality of that decision is
sufficiently strong to warrant clear evidence of a breach of a union's duty of fair representation before the
courts should overturn the arbitration award.").
161. See Speidel, supra note I1, at 191-92 ("Finality is part of the package that supposedly gives
arbitration an advantage over litigation. It is a core ingredient in the concept of arbitration."); Stewart, supra
note 60, at 347-48 n.4 (listing among "virtues trumpeted" about arbitration fact that "the process provides
finality, since there is virtually no right of appeal").
162. Galbraith, for example, writes, "[t]he federal courts of the United States are immensely
overcrowded. Each year, more cases are filed than in the previous year, making the administration ofjustice
progressively more difficult. The search for solutions to this problem has continually focused upon
alternative dispute resolution, and, in particular, arbitration." Galbraith, supra note 61, at 241 (footnotes
omitted); see also Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1197 (7th Cir.
1987) (noting "the warm judicial regard for arbitration evident in the modem cases-a warmth that in part
reflects modem caseload pressures").
163. Speidel, supra note 111, at 161 ("Arbitration is touted as a private process where confidence is
normally maintained while the opposite is true in court.").
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A. The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act:
A Model for Reform
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,' 64 the
federal courts have been required to apply substantive state law to state-law
claims that come before them. 65 While the federal bench is equipped to
apply state law when the courts of that state have spoken to the legal question
at issue, they are without a means to "resolve legal issues that have not been
squarely decided by the highest court of the relevant jurisdiction."'' 66 When
a case in federal court raises a state-law issue of first impression, that court
faces a challenge in divining the relevant state doctrine. 67
Prior to the introduction of the certification procedure discussed below, the
federal courts had established two processes for confronting novel issues of
state law: abstention, whereby a federal court declines to decide the state-law
question, and prediction, whereby the court attempts to anticipate what a state
supreme court would do.' 68 Abstention leads to considerable delay because
parties must litigate their cases anew in the state trial courts. 69 While
prediction avoids this delay, federal courts experience tremendous difficulty in
trying to predict the outcome of an identical case hypothetically brought before
the relevant state supreme court; at times, the federal court's prediction is
proven incorrect by a subsequent state court holding. 7 As when arbitrators
face novel questions of federal law, an adjudicator outside the relevant legal
system is left to extrapolate from that jurisdiction's existing law.
In response to these concerns, most states have enacted the Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act or an analogous piece of legislation.1
7 1
Recommended by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1967,172 the Uniform Act permits state supreme courts to answer
164. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
165. PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 304-05 (3d ed. 1994) (explaining that, while Erie itself was a diversity case, its requirement
that federal courts apply substantive state law applies to other classes of cases in which federal courts hear
state-law claims).
166. Geri J. Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,
3 (1989).
167. See Note, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 55 IOWA L. REV. 465, 465 (1969).
168. Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for Reform, 18
J. LEGIS. 127, 135 (1992).
169. John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 411, 416 (1988).
170. See, e.g., id. at 415 n.11 (listing examples of cases in which state courts rejected federal
interpretations of state law).
171. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 334 n.57 (5th ed. 1994).
172. Yonover, supra note 166, at 16.
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questions of unsettled state law certified from federal courts. Section 1 of the
Uniform Certification Act provides specifically that the state supreme court:
may answer questions of law certified to it... when requested by the
certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it
questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause
then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the
certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of
the [Supreme Court] [and the intermediate appellate courts] of this
state.1
73
This certification procedure has met with considerable satisfaction. 74 While
it does impose some costs, in terms of delay and expense, on the litigants, it
mitigates harms that are similar to those identified in Part III with respect to
novel legal claims in arbitration. As Professors Corr and Robbins note, "the
long-range benefits of certification-consistency in the law and finality of state
pronouncements that makes it unnecessary for future parties to litigate the
same issue-will often outweigh the inconveniences imposed on the litigants
involved in a particular case."' 75 The procedural mechanism this Note
recommends is based on this model, designed to promote a communicative link
between arbitrators and the courts. Unlike federal-state certification, however,
in which state courts are to resolve questions that have received inconsistent
state court treatment in addition to truly novel legal claims, the procedure
recommended for arbitrator-court interaction would only allow for certification
of questions of the latter sort.
B. The Uniform Certification Act Applied to FAA Arbitration
This Note proposes an amendment to the FAA to provide for a procedure,
analogous to federal-state certification, whereby parties can receive a federal
court's decision on a novel point of law raised in arbitration. Under the
proposed procedure, if a party to a private arbitration raises a statutory claim
that she believes would constitute a novel question for the federal courts, she
may ask the arbitrator to certify that question to a federal district court. It is
for the arbitrator (1) to make the factual determination of whether the legal
claim is dispositive of the case, given the facts as she finds them, and (2) to
examine case law presented by the parties or that she herself discovers to
173. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW AcT §1, 12 U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1995) (alterations
in original).
174. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 171, § 52, at 334 ('The certification procedure has been regarded
with quite an extraordinary enthusiasm by the commentators...."); Yonover, supra note 166, at 16-17
("Mhe notion of certification is alive and well in many jurisdictions and has been frequently approved of
by commentators and the Supreme Court alike." (footnotes omitted)).
175. Corr & Robbins, supra note 169, at 430; see also Robbins, supra note 168, at 137 (noting that
resolution of cases of first impression through certification procedures can decrease future litigation).
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determine whether the question is novel. As for the latter decision, the
arbitrator's role is to weed out claims of novelty that are mere attempts to stall
the arbitration process or to avoid a body of controlling precedent that is
detrimental to the certifying party. Arbitrators who believe that no federal court
has addressed the claim at issue must certify it to the federal district court that
would have jurisdiction over the dispute.
If the arbitrator's factual findings do not render the legal claim dispositive,
or if the arbitrator determines that she has sufficient guidance from the courts
on the question at issue, there should be no certification. 76 If, however, the
arbitrator finds that the legal question is both dispositive and novel, she would
be required to submit it to the federal district court with an adequate factual
record to allow for a judicial response. As with the certification process
currently in use between federal courts and state supreme courts, once a
question is certified, the receiving tribunal would be permitted to request
additional factual information from the certifying body if neceisary to answer
the stated question. The federal district court would also make an independent
determination as to whether the claim presents a novel legal question. Again,
the relevant determination would be whether the question were novel for the
federal judiciary generally: The procedure is not to serve as an opportunity to
add precedent to one side of an existing dispute within or among federal
circuits. Indeed, such a use would run counter to both of the arguments against
the private resolution of novel legal questions discussed in Part 11: (1) Even
if courts have decided an issue inconsistently, the arbitrator would have some
judicial guidance on a question of statutory law; and (2) the addition of
precedent in an area already addressed by other federal courts might muddle,
rather than clarify, legal doctrine.
If the court determines that the issue is not novel, it should, like the state
supreme courts under the Uniform Certification Act, return it without a
response.'77 If, however, the court decides to reach the merits of the certified
question, the parties would be asked to present arguments on the issue, and the
court's decision would be subject to appeal through the normal process.
The court's ultimate decision on the question of law must be binding on
the arbitrator; t7 8 the arbitrator would be required to provide a (brief) written
explanation of her decision, including an explicit account of the way in which
the court's holding figured into the award. Arbitrators would continue to
receive the degree of deference they currently enjoy with respect to their
176. Yonover, supra note 166, at 20 (describing Seventh Circuit refusals to certify questions, despite
party's request, because "there was sufficient precedent" on the issue or the "state law was not so unsettled
as to justify the use of certification").
177. See, e.g., Western Helicopter Servs. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627 (Or. 1991)
(refusing to answer certified question because it represented settled point of law).
178. This is essential to satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement. See U.S. CONST. art III,
§ 2.
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awards, as long as they incorporate the response to the certified question as
binding on their decision.
The notion of a certification mechanism between arbitrators and courts is
not unprecedented. As shown in Part II, early initiatives in this country,
building on the English model, included certification procedures, different in
that they aimed to capture any question of law, but structurally similar to what
this Note proposes. Indeed, this proposal would require a return to such a
certification procedure, this time at the federal level, and with the significant
modification that only novel legal questions would receive a judicial response.
CONCLUSION
This Note does not mean to suggest that arbitration is appropriate in all
cases involving statutory claims. Congress may determine that certain causes
of action, such as those based on Title VII law,179 should simply not go to
arbitration. The notion of conferring federal jurisdiction based on the newness
of a legal claim is meant, rather, as a modest recommendation tailored to meet
what is an especially troublesome aspect of the arbitration of statutory claims.
Particularly in light of recent Supreme Court decisions assuming a degree of
legal expertise on the part of arbitrators, it is important that there be a means
of handling issues that even an expert would have difficulty resolving: issues
that the courts themselves have not yet addressed. Moreover, such a procedure
would ensure that, no matter how large the number of arbitrated statutory
claims becomes, novel questions will continue to reach the courts and facilitate
the law's development.
179. In 1994, members of both houses of Congress introduced legislation to prevent the arbitration
of various employment discrimination claims, including causes of action arising under Title VII. Waks et
al., supra note 5, at 446. As of yet, there has been no significant action on these proposals.
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